

# US MISSION | AFGHANISTAN



## U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR AFGHANISTAN POST PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT PLAN-2011-2015

Volume I - Summary

# VOLUME I – SUMMARY

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## ACRONYMS

ACT	Anti-Corruption Tribunal
ADS	Automated Directive System
ADSP	Agricultural Development and Stability Program
ADT	Agri-Business Development Team
AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
AMSP	Afghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
AO	Activity Objective
APAP	Afghanistan Parliament Assistance Program
ASAP	Accelerating Sustainable Agriculture Program
ASI	Afghan Stabilization Initiative
AVIPA	Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture
AWATT	Afghanistan Water, Agriculture and Technology Transfer
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
CBSG	Community-Based Stabilization Grants
CEPPS	Consortium for Electoral and Political Processes Support
CERP	Commanders Emergency Response Program
CFW	Cash-for-Work
CHAMP	Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing
COIN	Counter-Insurgency
CSSC	Civil Society Support Centers
CSSP	Corrections System Support Program
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer
DCA	Development Credit Authority
DOC	Department of Commerce
DQA	Data Quality Assessment
DSF	District Stability Framework
DST	District Support Team
EG	Economic Growth
EWG	Executive Work Group
F	Director of Foreign Assistance
FACTS	Foreign Assistance Coordination and Tracking System
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FIRUP	Food Insecurity Response for Urban Populations
GDA	Global Development Alliance
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GIRoA	Government of the Republic of Afghanistan
HOO	High Office of Oversight
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission

ICT	Information Communication Technology
IDA	International Development Association
IDLG	Independent Directorate for Local Governance
IEC	Independent Election Commission
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFES	International Foundation for Elections Systems
IFI	International Financial Institution
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INL	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IQC	Indefinite Quantity Contract
IR	Intermediate Result
IRI	International Republican Institute
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KAP	Knowledge Attitudes and Practices
LGCD	Local Governance and Community Development
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
NAPWA	National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAA	Office of Administrative Affairs
OP	Operational Plan
OTI	Office of Transitional Initiatives
PASA	Participating Agency Service Agreement
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PICU	Project Implementation and Coordination Unit
PIRS	Performance Indicator Reference Sheets
PMP	Performance Management Plan
PPR	Performance Plan and Report
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RF	Results Framework
RFA	Request for Application
RFP	Request for Proposal
RFP	Request for Proposal
RLS	Rule of Law Stabilization Program
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SO	Strategic Objective
S-T	Short-Term

STEP	Support to the Elections Process
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USG	United States Government
USTR	United States Trade Representative
VRP	Voter Registration Project
WTO	World Trade Organization

## **I. EXECUTIVE NOTE**

The Performance Manage Plan (PMP) is the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan’s tool to plan and manage the process of assessing and reporting progress towards assistance/foreign policy objectives identified by the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The PMP establishes a systematic process to: monitor and evaluate the achievements of assistance programs, collect and analyze performance information to track progress toward planned results, use performance information and evaluations to influence decision-making and resource allocation, and communicate results achieved or not attained. Furthermore, a PMP contains a “Results Framework,” which defines the development/foreign policy hypothesis and illustrates the cause-and effect linkages between outputs, intermediate results, and outcomes/impacts.

In accordance with the London Conference and Kabul Conference communiqués, the USG intends to channel at least 50% of its assistance funds through the GIRoA’s core budget within two years while the GIRoA achieves the necessary reforms to strengthen its public financial management systems, reduce corruption, improve budget execution, and increase revenue collection to finance key National Priority Programs. In addition, the USG intends to progressively align its development assistance behind the National Priority Programs with the goal of achieving 80% of alignment within the next two years. The PMP identifies the linkages between USG managed programs and the National Priority Programs identified in the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). It documents how U.S. assistance supports these programs and how the results achieved by U.S. assistance support the objectives outlined in the ANDS.

## **II. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. HISTORY OF THE USAID/AFGHANISTAN PMP**

Following approval of USAID/Afghanistan's five-year Strategic Plan (2006-2010), the Mission developed and approved in May 2006 a Performance Management Plan (PMP) to track and measure the implementation of its new strategy. That strategy, the first since USAID returned to the country after the 1979 Soviet invasion and subsequent rise and fall of the Taliban, addressed the need for stabilization, regulatory and economic reforms, and developing the capacity to plan and manage the implementation of these measures. The strategy aimed to support the rapid transition of Afghanistan to a more stable and productive state through the promotion of democracy, rule of law, and sustainable economic and social development responsive to citizens' needs.

The Mission designed the original PMP to plan, manage, and report performance for 2006 through 2008. The Strategic Objective (SO) teams provided data for the indicators during 2006 and 2007, but stopped thereafter, when the SO teams were unable to provide data as program priorities changed and the security situation deteriorated.

USAID/Afghanistan adopted a new foreign assistance framework in 2008 to prepare the FY 2008 Operational Plan (OP). For the first time, the Mission selected indicators at the program element level from a standard list of indicators and submitted targets and results in the FY 2008 Performance Plan and Report (PPR).

Beginning in August 2009, the U.S. adopted two new strategies. The purpose of this new PMP is to adopt a series of performance measures for the period 2011-2015, in accordance with ADS 203.3.3. The PMP covers the entire USG foreign assistance portfolio in Afghanistan, including outputs, intermediate outcomes, outcomes, and impacts and also sets a timeline of expected evaluations and impact assessments.

### **B. COUNTRY LEVEL STRATEGIES**

The President's December 2009 West Point speech laid the foundation for the U.S. Afghanistan Strategy and identified priorities in which the U.S. will address to secure Afghanistan and establish the conditions necessary to transfer reconstruction effort to the Afghan people. In addition, approved of a Civilian-Military Campaign Plan<sup>1</sup> and the issuance in February 2010 of a new regional stabilization strategy,<sup>2</sup> the USG redirected its focus in Afghanistan on the Afghan people and adopted an integrated, synchronized effort by civilian and military teams to work across the security, development, governance, and information sectors in new and comprehensive ways.

The President's speech and both strategy documents highlight the importance of a strong partnership with the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in order to build

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Embassy, Kabul and U.S. Forces Afghanistan. "United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan, August 10, 2009.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of State "Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy" February 24, 2010.

its capacity to provide its people a stable future. These strategies resulted from close collaboration with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as well as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and partner nations. Although the new strategies do not explicitly identify the timeframe covered, they typically cover a five year period between FY 2011–2015.

### **PRESIDENT’S WEST POINT ADDRESS**

During his address to cadets at West Point, President Obama laid out three clear objectives to bolster security and clear a path for development in Afghanistan. Specifically the U.S. interventions will pursue a military strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 18 months; work with international partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that GIRoA can take advantage of improved security; and that USG success in Afghanistan is inextricably linked to USG partnership with Pakistan. U.S. foreign assistance supports the second and third objectives of the President’s plan. The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan will utilize assistance resources to create a foundation necessary to support changes and capitalize on security. Assistance programs build the capacity of key Afghan ministries that provide critical services, thereby legitimizing the Afghan Government. The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan is also rapidly deploying staff throughout Afghanistan and providing with the tools and resources necessary to effect changes and transform Afghanistan to a stable and productive country. Lastly, the U.S. Mission in developing programs that address cross-border activities such as trade and economic development. These activities foster partnerships between Afghans and Pakistanis and strengthen both countries’ commitments ensure that border regions are no longer a safe haven for terrorists or the Taliban.

### **NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STRATEGY**

The primary role of the NSC strategy is to *Disrupt, Dismantle, and Defeat Al-Qa’ida and its Violent Extremist Affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Around the World*. Specially, Afghanistan and Pakistan are the epicenters of the violent extremism practiced by al Qa’ida. The danger from this region will only grow if its security slides backward, the Taliban controls large swaths of Afghanistan, and al-Qa’ida is allowed to operate with impunity. To prevent future attacks on the United States, our allies, and partners, we must work with others to keep the pressure on al-Qa’ida and increase the security and capacity of our partners in this region.

In Afghanistan, we must deny al-Qa’ida a safe haven, deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the government, and strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future. Within Pakistan, the USG is working with the government to address the local, regional, and global threat from violent extremists.

The USG achieve these objectives with a strategy comprised of three components:

- A. The USG military and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) partners within Afghanistan are targeting the insurgency, working to secure key population



centers, and increasing efforts to train Afghan security forces. These military resources will allow us to create the conditions to transition to Afghan responsibility.

- B. The USG will continue to work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan Government to improve accountable and effective governance. As we work to advance our strategic partnership with the Afghan Government, we are focusing assistance on supporting the President of Afghanistan and those ministries, governors, and local leaders who combat corruption and deliver for the people.
- C. The USG will foster a relationship with Pakistan founded upon mutual interests and mutual respect. To defeat violent extremists who threaten both of our countries, we will strengthen Pakistan's capacity to target violent extremists within its borders, and continue to provide security assistance to support those efforts.

The assistance under the authority of the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan supports this strategy. Specifically, assistance will create the conditions necessary to transfer reconstruction efforts to the Afghans. Furthermore, assistance is strengthening the GIRoA systems to provide services directly to Afghans and improve oversight and government accountability. The U.S. Mission uses this strategy as a guide when designing and implementing assistance programs.

#### **AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN REGIONAL STABILIZATION STRATEGY**

The “*Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy*” sets forth a “whole-of-government strategy” to protect vital U.S. interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan and bring stability to both nations. The Strategy’s core goal is “to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda and its safe havens in Pakistan, and to prevent their return to Pakistan or Afghanistan.” In Afghanistan it focuses on developing the capacity of Afghan institutions to withstand and diminish the threat posed by extremism and to deliver high impact economic development. The Strategy also mandates that civilian interventions be integrated and synchronized with military activities, while acknowledging that “the pace and reach of civilian program implementation depends on a security environment permissive enough to allow civilian efforts to proceed.” The strategy identifies six Assistance Objectives and six cross-cutting themes.

#### **Functional Objectives**

**Rebuilding Afghanistan’s Agricultural Sector:** The number one development priority is to restore Afghanistan’s once vibrant agricultural sector through a civilian-military agricultural development strategy. This effort is being spearheaded by the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL) with support from USAID, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Army National Guard Agri-Business Development Teams. The sector objectives are to increase agricultural jobs and income and increase Afghans’ confidence in their government.

**Strengthening Afghan Governance:** Foremost among the U.S. governance objectives is to help make local government more visible, accountable, and responsive, particularly in the

South and the East. Priority is to be given to “reform-oriented service delivery ministries” while broadening U.S. support and engagement at the provincial and district levels. All planned governance interventions will include support for reinvigorated Afghan plans to reduce corruption by strengthening institutions that can provide checks on government power. Other objectives in this sector include enhancing Afghan capacity by extensive training of civil servants and supporting efforts to reform Afghanistan’s electoral system and democratic institutions.

**Enhancing Afghan Rule of Law:** The principal focus of the U.S. rule of law effort is to reverse the public perception of GIRoA as weak or predatory by helping the Afghan government and local communities develop responsive and predictable dispute resolution mechanisms that offer an alternative to the Taliban shadow justice system. Assistance will be provided in support of Afghan efforts to strengthen the formal state justice system, stabilize the traditional justice system, and build a safe, secure, and humane civilian corrections system.

**Supporting Afghan-led Reintegration:** The U.S. will provide political and financial support to the Afghan government’s reintegration program that will reach out to communities, individuals, and groups. Employing USAID and CERP funds, and contributions from international donors, the reintegration program will provide targeted economic development and licit job creation, especially in agriculture, for former insurgents.

**Combating the Afghan Narcotics Trade:** The Strategy emphasizes interdiction instead of eradication. In addition to activities to reduce demand and public information campaigns, it focuses on creating licit jobs and income in the agricultural sector by providing farmers with sustainable alternatives to poppy cultivation.

**Building an Economic Foundation for Afghanistan’s Future:** This part of the new Strategy encompasses both stabilization and economic development programs that are expected to provide a foundation for sustainable economic growth. It seeks to create sustainable private sector jobs, increase government capacity in support of economic growth and development, expand and improve energy and infrastructure, and promote government fiscal sustainability. As in the Civ-mil Plan, focus is also centered primarily on population centers and key economic corridors.

### **Cross-Cutting Themes**

**Increased Direct Assistance:** Increasing levels of assistance are being channeled directly through Afghan government organizations and projects, including directly to Afghan ministries that have been certified to receive direct U.S. funding. The USG intends to channel at least 50% of its assistance funds through the GIRoA’s core budget within two years.

**Improved Accountability:** In addition to significantly increased numbers of additional personnel employed to monitor program implementation, the number of multi-year contracts

to U.S. firms and organizations has been slashed and new mechanisms to improve performance introduced.

**Decentralization:** Improvement in project implementation is expected to result from greater devolution of implementation authority to USAID officials assigned to regional civ-mil platforms (Regional Commands and PRTs). Projects are expected to be more responsive to local needs as a result of this improved coordination.

**Afghan First:** The new U.S. strategic approach is to support Afghan leadership, capacity-building efforts, and increased local procurement.

**True Partnership:** Afghans are at the center of the design, procurement, and implementation of U.S. assistance programs, a process promoted by some 55 U.S. advisors working in core Afghan ministries. Moreover, USG activities are aligned not only with the Afghan National Development Strategy, but several Afghan sector strategies. The USG intends to align its development assistance behind the National Priority Programs with the goal of achieving 80% of alignment within the next two years

**Advancing the Rights of Afghan Women and Girls:** Women's empowerment is inextricably linked to the achievement of USG objectives in Afghanistan – including improvements in areas such as security, economic opportunity, governance, and social development. Accordingly, the Strategy emphasizes assistance to build women's capacity to participate fully in Afghan society by:

- Improving the security of women and institutions that serve women;
- Supporting women's leadership development in the public, private, and voluntary sectors;
- Promoting women's access to formal and informal justice mechanisms;
- Enforcing existing law and Constitutional rights of women;
- Improving women's and girls' access to education and healthcare;
- Strengthening and expanding economic development opportunities for women, especially in the agriculture sector; and
- Increasing women's political empowerment and participation.

### INTEGRATED CIVILIAN-MILITARY CAMPAIGN PLAN

The *United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military (Civ-mil) Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan* aims to reverse insurgent momentum by refocusing U.S. efforts on the Afghan population and implementing a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) or stabilization campaign. Civ-mil teams are organized at the district, provincial, and regional levels to implement the COIN measures, including new investments in critical infrastructure and service delivery systems. This approach requires that increased GIRoA capacity be sustainable at all levels from the local village to the capital Kabul. The plan also establishes 11 key counter-insurgency “transformative effects” or change objectives cutting across security, development, governance, and information operations.<sup>3</sup> The effects are:

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<sup>3</sup> All of these effects are encompassed within the six Assistance Objectives included in the Af-Pak strategy.

1. Population Security;
2. Claiming the Information Initiative;
3. Access to Justice;
4. Expansion of Accountable and Transparent Governance;
5. Elections and Continuity of Governance;
6. Creating Sustainable Jobs for Population Centers;
7. Agricultural Opportunity and Market Access;
8. Action against Irreconcilables;
9. Countering the Nexus of Insurgency, Narcotics, Corruption and Criminality;
10. Community and Government-led Reintegration; and
11. Cross-border Access for Commerce not Insurgents

At the core of the civ-mil campaign plan is a geographic focus on unstable districts and regions of the country. Some 80 “key-terrain” districts have been identified for interventions in 2010 and 2011. The highest COIN priority is to target southern Afghanistan and, most notably, Helmand and Kandahar provinces, the heart of the insurgency. The second priority is eastern Afghanistan. The objective is to protect the population and “create space for previously isolated communities and government” to undertake security, reconstruction, and governance. The civ-mil strategy and activities assume that “securing the most unstable provinces will have a cascading impact on the rest of the country.”

The Plan also presents the organizational and management framework for all USG elements to work together in concert with ISAF elements at the five primary levels of operational responsibility: national, regional, sub-regional, provincial, and district.

**National Level:** A deputies-level senior decision-making body (including USAID) makes national policy and decisions regarding the Campaign Plan. Working-level civ-mil groups are responsible for further development, monitoring, and assessment of their respective counter-insurgency activities in the Plan. They also oversee execution of the Plan, assess progress periodically, and work with relevant GIROA and international partners on implementation.

**Regional Integrated Team (IT-R):** Led by the RC Commander (CDR), a three-star General, these four regional commands provide support and guidance to subordinate levels, develop and implement an integrated civ-mil plan, assess progress, and allocate resources. Each regional command has a Civ-Mil Fusion Cell where civilian, international, and military elements are represented.

**Sub-Regional Integrated Team (IT-S):** This civilian team synchronizes all USG civilian efforts in the sub-regional area. It includes sub-regional military commanders and the brigade combat team commander, the USG Senior Civilian Representative, and representatives of other government agencies.

**Provincial Integrated Team (IT-P):** The IT-P focuses on implementation, but also supports and guides district level activities. It is led by leaders of the Provincial

Reconstruction Team (PRT), the Agri-Business Development Team (ADT) the battalion equivalent, SOF elements, the ANSF mentor and partner teams and the provincial USG civilian lead. The PRT, USAID, DOS and USDA representatives and other implementing partners operating in the province support the latter.

**District Support Team (DST):** Comprised of all USG civilian elements plus ISAF military forces in the district, the DST is a joint civilian and military action group directed by the USG civilian lead, commanders of the primary military elements, and the ANSF mentor and partner team. Although focused primarily on implementing activities at the district level, it also formulates a civ-mil plan for district support, assesses progress in achieving stability in the area, allocates resources, and engages key international community and GIRoA partners.

The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan utilizes the Civil-Military Campaign Plan as a tool to understand the effect of assistance efforts on COIN objectives. The plan is a tactical document to inform the implementation of reconstruction projects and ensure their coordination with military efforts. USG assistance interventions link to all 11 transformative effects, but it is important to note that the USG does not use this plan to design programs. The USG designs programs based on the President's West Point address, the Regional Stabilization Strategy, the Afghan National Development Strategies. These strategies are recognized as the primary USG policies that assistance is to follow. USG assistance programming is in line with the objectives identified during the Kabul Conference.

### **AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY**

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) serves as Afghanistan's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and uses the pillars, principles and benchmarks of the Afghanistan Compact as a foundation. The pillars and goals of the ANDS are:

1. **Security:** Achieve nationwide stabilization, strengthen law enforcement, and improve personal security for every Afghan.
2. **Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights:** Strengthen democratic processes and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services and government accountability.
3. **Economic and Social Development:** Reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through a private-sector-led market economy, improve human development indicators, and make significant progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).

The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan utilizes the ANDS as a guide to design and implement assistance programs to support GIRoA identified priorities and programs. The ANDS is an integral part of assistance and is the foundations that will build the sustainable development and ensure that reconstruction efforts are Afghan led. The USG is committed to supporting the ANDS and will progressively align its development assistance behind the National Priority Programs identified in ANDS with the goal of achieving 80% of alignment within the next two years.

## **C. FUNDING ASSUMPTIONS**

Funding levels expected to achieve the planned results over the five year (2011-2015) implementation period have yet to be determined. Resources requested for year one (FY 2011) that cover the civilian activities described in this PMP total \$ 3.853 billion. By Activity Objective this level includes the following: Rebuilding the Agricultural Sector, \$240 million; Strengthening Governance, \$1.760 billion; Enhancing Rule of Law, \$248 million; Combating Narcotics, \$437 million; Building a Foundation for Afghanistan's Future, \$1.152 billion; and Other \$16 million. Although long-term budget forecasts for the years FY 2012 – FY 2015 are unknown, there is a high degree of confidence that Congress, USAID, and Department of State will sustain the civilian surge and provide appropriate resources to achieve the performance results identified in this PMP.

## **D. MEASURING PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS**

The annual *Survey of the Afghan People* conducted by The Asia Foundation (TAF) is a useful nationwide assessment of Afghan public opinion for policy makers and actors in government, civil society, the international community, and the broader Afghan citizenry. The Survey provides a snapshot of national perceptions in key policy areas including governance, democratic values, women and society, security, and the economy. Assistance Objective teams use the TAF survey to gauge changes in public perceptions as result of USG assistance activities.

# **III. IMPLEMENTING THE PMP**

## **A. DATA COLLECTION**

### **BASELINE AND TARGET DATA**

There are many indicators that do not have baseline data or targets. Some are Mission outcome or impact indicators that are either new or were in the previous PMP but for which data was never collected. Still others are suggested indicators for new activities now in the design stage that Technical Teams need to decide upon once leadership authorize the activities. A few Mission custom output indicators also need baseline data for the same reasons explained above. Some indicators may have baseline data, but lack target data, so targets for these indicators are required. This PMP proposes setting baseline and targets in the first and second quarter of FY 2011. Targets for all F indicators have to be set in the first quarter as part of the Performance Plan and Reporting process. In some cases AO teams need to finalize the indicators before baseline and target information is collected.

### **AO AND IR LEVEL PERFORMANCE DATA**

Many of the AO and IR level indicators are custom Mission outcome or impact indicators and will, in some cases, require conducting surveys to obtain data. This PMP suggests that surveys on outcome and impact indicators be conducted in Quarter 1 or Quarter 2 of FY 2011

(baseline survey) and follow-on surveys a year or two later, depending on the periodicity of the proposed survey. A number of these surveys will be conducted by third party entities that normally collect this kind of data, so USAID will be obliged to adjust its schedule for obtaining the data based on when these entities conduct the surveys.

### **ACTIVITY LEVEL DATA**

This data relates to F standard and custom indicators reported annually; so the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan needs to acquire this information during the first quarter from implementing partners (at least a month before the Performance Plan and Report is due). Mission COTRs and Activity Managers should make sure that partners regularly collect performance data, particularly OP indicator data, to avoid any delays in compiling and submitting that data to USAID for the Performance Plan and Report.

### **REVIEWING PERFORMANCE INFORMATION**

The main mechanisms for reviewing performance data are the semi-annual performance reviews (also called portfolio reviews). Performance reviews not only offer an opportunity to review progress on program implementation, but also the results of the projects to ensure annual targets have been met or are on track for being met. Performance reviews take place in the first and third quarter of the year. In addition to performance reviews, the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan will hold quarterly reviews data collected to ensure quality. The USAID Program Office will lead these efforts and work with all USAID Technical Office and relevant Embassy Sections.

## **B. REPORTING**

### **PERFORMANCE RESULTS**

Performance results on Standard F indicators are reported in the first quarter of the fiscal year (November 30<sup>th</sup>). Mission custom indicator data should also be reported during that time. The Mission should encourage implementing partners to schedule their surveys for assessing project outcomes during the last quarter of the year so that survey results can also be reported to USAID as part of the annual reporting. Surveys done by third party partners are harder to schedule, but USAID should work with the third party entities implementing these surveys to have them done according to their normal schedule (e.g., every 3-5 years for DHS or similar surveys).

### **ON- DEMAND**

Although performance monitoring is essentially a semi-annual and annual process within the framework of established results management approaches, demands for performance information are constant and various in a high profile program such as Afghanistan's. The Afghan Info database, enabled to track performance indicators in addition to activity inputs and outputs, will be the basis for contributing to other regular, on-going reporting exercises and to the many ad-hoc requests for performance analysis that are a constant element of the environment of high profile programs. To meet these needs, the addition of the PMP

tracking capability, user friendly input interfaces (so that data is recent and accurate), and an agile reporting and analytical module will be essential.

### **C. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT**

Performance management is a shared responsibility that depends for its success on the “ownership” of USAID activity managers, implementing partners, and senior management. Experience shows that the only way to successfully develop a performance monitoring and reporting system for a large program spanning so many operating units is to collaborate closely with those units. USAID and its USG collaborators should continue this participatory approach and involve as many actors as possible along the way. Thus, the overall approach to PMP system development and execution is a combination of technical inputs by the Program and technical offices and frequent communication and discussion with implementing partners.

### **D. IMPLEMENTING PARTNER RESPONSIBILITIES**

The U.S. Mission in Afghanistan will adopt language to be included in bilateral contracts and grants that specify the duties of the implementing partners to perform monitoring functions, adopt Mission performance indicators whenever possible, and especially provide data in the formats specified by the Mission. It is important that this language always be inserted in RFPs and RFA’s so that bidders will adequately budget for their M&E responsibilities.



## IV. U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE RESULTS FRAMEWORK

### Goal: Stable and Effective Afghan-Led Development

AO 1: Improved performance and accountability of governance.	AO 2: Improved health of the population.	AO 3: Improved access to quality education services.	AO 4: A developed business climate that enables private investment, job creation, and financial independence.	AO 5: A Sustainable, thriving agricultural economy.	AO 6: Expanded, sustainable physical infrastructure.	AO 7: Stability sufficient for basic governance and sustainable development.	AO 8: Increased management effectiveness of GIRoA institutions.
IR 1.1: Increased public confidence in the Rule of Law system.	IR 2.1: Effective utilization of BPHS and other client-oriented health services increased.	IR 3.1: Management capacity strengthened to deliver education services at the national, provincial, and district levels.	IR 4.1: Effective fiscal and monetary policy implemented.	IR 5.1: Increased agricultural sector jobs and incomes as a result of USG assistance.	IR 6.1: More efficient use of expanded water resources.	IR 7.1: Local SOIs in targeted areas addressed.	IR 8.1: Core functions of selected ministries improved.
IR 1.2: Strengthened competitive, inclusive and credible election.	IR 2.2: Healthy behaviors adopted.	IR 3.2: Quality basic education expanded.	IR 4.2: Policy, legal and regulatory framework for key economic sectors	IR 5.2: Improved Natural Resource Management as a result of USG assistance.	IR 6.2: Improved management of an expanded network of roads.	IR 7.2: Basic local governance established.	IR 8.2: Afghan First Advanced.
IR 1.3: Strengthened governance and service delivery at national and sub-national levels.	IR 2.3: GIRoA stewardship of the health system improved.	IR 3.3: Increased employability of Afghan Youth and Adults.	IR 4.3: Competitiveness of private sector enhanced.	IR 5.3: Improved delivery of agricultural-related public services as a result of USG assistance.	IR 6.3: Better managed supply of electricity to a larger number of consumers.	IR 7.3: Transition from stabilization assistance to sustainable development facilitated.	IR 8.3: Increased utilization of on-budget development assistance.
IR 1.4: Increased development of politically active civil society.	IR 2.4: Private sector health services and products strengthened.		IR 4.4: Workforce meets private and public-sector demands.		IR 6.4 IR: An expanded and better managed network of vertical structures to support goals in health care, education, and governance.	Contextual IR: Freedom of movement increased for key stakeholders because of military efforts.	
IR 1.5: Delegitimize the influence of insurgent communications.							

## **I. OVERVIEW**

### **A. CONTEXT**

President Karzai's second inaugural address in November 2009 set forth an ambitious agenda and the U.S. Embassy is encouraging the Afghan government to take strong actions. Activities include combating corruption, improving governance, providing better services for the people of Afghanistan, and maintaining and expanding on the important democratic reforms and advances in women's rights that have been made since 2001.

The hallmark of the Kabul Process is Afghan leadership and ownership. The London Conference, the Peace Jirga, and the 2010 Kabul Conference highlight the Afghan government's commitment to improving governance, as well as security and economic opportunity. In the area of Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights the Kabul Conference communiqué states "Good governance, the rule of law, and human rights form the foundation of the strategy to achieve a stable and prosperous Afghanistan ... It is also crucial that the Government, in pursuing its reforms, continue to consult with the people through their representative bodies, civil society, and other mechanisms." Key areas of specific commitments include:

- A strategy for long-term electoral reform;
- Access to the delivery of justice throughout Afghanistan;
- Measures to increase transparency and accountability and tackle corruption;
- Implementation of Sub-National Governance Policy, and strengthening local institutional capacity, including training of civil servants and development of training curricula, and development of sub-national regulatory, financing, and budgetary frameworks; and
- Human rights, legal awareness and civic education program implementation targeting communities across Afghanistan to foster a more informed public and civil society, and to increase Government accountability.

### **B. STRATEGIC COHERENCE**

The Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy,<sup>4</sup> reflects the urgency US policy attaches to building on the democracy and governance gains made since 2002. The AfPak Strategy consists of governance elements that are integrated and synchronized with military activities to achieve short, medium, and long-term objectives. Democracy and governance programming will, therefore, support and reinforce military and police efforts to improve security in Afghanistan.

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) "Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights" strategic priority is to strengthen democratic processes and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services and government accountability. The ANDS governance agenda addresses three major challenges: pervasive corruption, low public sector capacity, and human rights deprivations of girls and women. One of the governance deficiencies

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<sup>4</sup>Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy, Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Updated February 24, 2010.

mentioned is “weak community and civil society institutions.” The proposed USG AO activities will contribute to addressing these challenges.

One key component of the USG’s stabilization strategy is to improve governance and to provide better services for the people of Afghanistan. In a supply – demand model, while improved government capacity is critical, it is also important to increase the ability of citizens to demand accountability and better services. Civil society organizations (CSO) provide a mechanism for citizens to channel their issues to decision makers. The USG will strengthen linkages between communities and the government, and provide citizens with skills and networks to better solve community problems and influence decision making. The expansion of civil society support will increase the number of citizens actively engaged in governance activities and processes. This is consistent with U.S. policy towards “broadening our support and engagement at the provincial and district levels to enhance the visibility, effectiveness, and accountability of the institutions that impact Afghan lives the most.” In addition, related to USG stabilization priorities on Rule of Law and Human Rights, this activity will build civil society’s capacity to advocate for women and contributes to empowering Afghan women as civil society leaders.

The USG has a vital national interest in helping the Afghans build an effective and legitimate state and government. Democracy and governance activities planned during the strategy years (2011 – 2015) include combating corruption, improving governance and the rule of law providing better services for the people of Afghanistan, and maintaining and expanding on the important democratic reforms and advances in women’s rights that have been made since 2001.

The USG will focus democracy and governance support at those Afghan ministries that can have a direct impact on service delivery, particularly in the geographic heart of the insurgency – the South and East. Adapting programs to account for local realities, and broadening support and engagement at the provincial and district levels will enhance the visibility, effectiveness, and accountability of the institutions that impact Afghan lives the most. USG provincial and districts programs will help the Afghan government provide economic opportunities that increase stability and reduce the strength of the insurgency. Democracy and governance programming will advance the rights of Afghan women and girls by improving access to justice, improving basic service delivery, and increasing women’s participation in the political process.

### **C. PROGRESS TO DATE**

Since 2002, USG assistance in democracy and governance assisted in the creation of an Afghan government with the capacity to be a legitimate alternative to Afghanistan’s authoritarian political past. The USG has substantively met previous intermediate results over the past four years. The results include: enhanced rule of law, strengthened election and political processes, strengthened institutions for good governance, and increased presence and performance of civil society.

USG support to civil society and the media has increased pluralism and transparency that are the foundation for a democratic and anticorruption regime. Since 2005, the USG supported components of a robust Afghan civil society infrastructure through a network of ten Afghan intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and Civil Society Support Centers (CSSCs) in provinces across the country to serve as conduits to remote geographical regions and smaller,

regional CSOs. USG support has helped develop the capacity of more than 220 Afghan CSOs and awarded more than \$10.5 million in grant support for CSO projects.

The USG Media Development Program supported independent radio stations and a national radio production unit that, so far, has produced more than 500 hours of public affairs programming aired on the radio network. Programs ranged from extensive coverage of the 2009 elections to local stories. More than 7 million Afghans are within the footprint of an independent radio station supported by this program.

Capacity building of Afghan CSOs has been a major accomplishment with a special emphasis on Afghan women-led CSOs and gender policy activities. The civil society sector has grown and developed significantly but is far from sustainable maturity. Few ordinary citizens understand how civic engagement improve their lives, and CSOs are still deficient in their capacity to provide effective channels for citizen participation in the political process.

## **II. USG RESPONSE**

The USG will address the democracy and governance challenges through the implementation of activities that support **Assistance Objective (AO) 1: Improved performance and accountability of governance system**. The USG identified five Intermediate Results expected to be achieved:

- Increasing the public confidence in the rule of law system,
- Strengthening election and political processes to be competitive, inclusive, and credible
- Strengthening governance and service delivery at national and sub-national level,
- Increasing development of politically active civil society,
- Delegitimize the influence of insurgent communications.

To support the assistance objective and intermediate results the USG will implement projects in rule of law, elections and political competition, governance, and civil society and independent media. The projects support the establishment of a broadly accepted national government that promotes national unity and effectively serves the needs of the Afghan people.

### **A. IR 1.1 – INCREASED PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE OF LAW SYSTEM**

This outcome is central to the USG strategy to develop the capacity and sustainability of the judiciary at national, provincial, and district levels. To achieve this strategy, the USG will implement governance and rule of law programs that expand the availability and quality of legal education, strengthen the public's awareness of legal rights and processes, and increase confidence in the formal and informal judicial systems. USG interventions will complement ISAF's expanded emphasis on training capable Afghan National Police. Critically important outcomes include:

- improved and expanded access to the formal justice sector by increasing capacity and reducing corruption in key state justice institutions;

- a safe, secure, and humane corrections system developed in partnership with the Afghan government;
- a stabilized traditional justice system, with an emphasis on informal dispute resolution councils to ensure dispute resolution needs in communities are being met;
- sustainable leadership capacity of the Afghan government's justice sector; and
- public legal outreach and awareness strengthened.

**Formal Justice System:** At the local and district levels, the USG will support capacity development of the formal state courts. The USG will partner with the Supreme Court of Afghanistan to provide technical assistance and training to increase the ability of state courts to provide competent justice services. The results of these efforts include: increased professional abilities of individual judges, continuing reforms of the case filing and management systems deployed by the Supreme Court to increase the speed and efficiency of the courts at the provincial and district levels, enforcing internal judicial ethics, and developing a cadre of vetted judges capable of handling corruption cases including those judges on the newly-formed Anti-Corruption Tribunal (ACT) in Kabul and various regional capitals.

**Informal Justice System:** The informal justice system program, in support of counterinsurgency efforts, will aid in re-establishing traditional dispute mechanisms. Innovative activities implemented with the awareness of the Afghan government and Afghan NGOs will include:

- educating the population about their legal rights under the Afghan Constitution;
- supporting tribal elders/religious leaders who conduct *shuras*;
- establishing linkages, as appropriate, between the informal and state systems;
- mapping the operation and function of the informal justice sector in the south and the east to support future stabilization efforts; and
- working with the Afghan Ministry of Justice (MOJ) to formalize links between the two systems to maximize the benefits of both systems and to reduce the weaknesses.

The USG plans to link traditional justice mechanisms with the evolving formal justice sector, which will play a significant role in expanding enforcement of the rights of women and other traditionally marginalized groups.

**Legal Skills Development:** Activities planned will lead to increased support for secular and Islamic law schools to ensure that the next generation of legal professionals is fully competent and capable of leading reform efforts started by the U.S., international community, and GIRoA. The future of Afghanistan's rule of law is based on their current law students and young lawyers; programs will assist them to better engage reliable and relevant rule of law practices with the introduction of practical legal skills courses, moot court and advocacy skills will produce more capable young lawyers, prosecutors, and judges. Study tours and scholarships for law professors will focus on developing their teaching skills and introducing them to modern teaching techniques.

**Anti-Corruption Assistance:** Various USG cross-cutting efforts will increase transparency and accountability and reduce opportunities for corruption. Assistance to the High Office of

Oversight (HOO) is a key component and the agency now has an operational structure and strategy. Public awareness and transparency of government officials' interests is enhanced by registration of assets of officials starting with 1500 registrations to be received over the next 12 month period. Future activities will strengthen HOO independence and legal mandates and provide further operational assistance. With this the HOO can act without political interference and with knowledgeable conviction to curb corrupt practices. Frequent meetings amongst all donors indicate that there will be a renewed international effort to encourage prosecutions for narcotics and corruption-related crimes and expand support for the Afghan Independent Anti-Corruption Tribunal, Major Crimes Task Force, and Anti-Corruption Unit.

**Correction Systems Improvements:** The USG will support the Afghan government to improve its corrections system, with a focus on the South and East by supporting de-radicalization teams, reintegration efforts, and rehabilitation programming for prisoners. The USG will train officials in Afghanistan's Central Prison Directorate with emphasis placed on women's rights. The USG Corrections System Support Program (CSSP) will renovate and construct Afghan corrections facilities supplanting the inhumane detention system that fostered insurrection with one that respects human rights and actual corrections.

**Promoting Women's Rights:** Rule of law programs will help Afghans to know and apply globally accepted human rights practices into real improvements in their lives. Specifically these programs will focus on women's rights by ensuring, protecting, and promoting gender rights in the Afghan judicial systems. Other programs will build civil society's capacity to advocate for women and monitor enforcement of laws protecting women, including the Elimination of Violence Against Women law. The USG will encourage the re-establishment of the Afghan Women Judges Association and development of an Afghan women lawyers network will be encouraged.

## **B. IR 1.2 - STRENGTHENED COMPETITIVE, INCLUSIVE, AND CREDIBLE ELECTION AND POLITICAL PROCESSES**

Efforts contributing to this IR will utilize Afghan-developed expertise to strengthen the Independent Election Commission (IEC) and a voter registry for the National Assembly elections scheduled for 2010. The Support to the Elections Process (STEP) program will strengthen the institutional capacity of the IEC to ensure transparency and broad-based participation in the electoral process throughout Afghanistan. This will in turn ensure a more representative government, seen as legitimate by the Afghan population. The Voter Registration Project (VRP) implemented through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) includes support for a national voter registration system that allows broad public participation and public education about the voter registration system. These programs will strengthen the ability of political stakeholders to articulate, organize, and compete in elections.

In addition to these programs, the USG will support civic and voter education, media development, the IEC operational and logistical systems, and observation of local elections to National Assembly elections. Support for the Increased Electoral Participation in Afghanistan program will enable the IEC to implement outreach and recruitment activities that are equally

accessible to all Afghan citizens and provide technical assistance to the Elections Complaints Commission (ECC) to decrease the possibility of electoral fraud.

Also contributing to the intermediate results are USG activities that will expand Afghan women's involvement in the political process and increase female leadership development initiatives. USG assistance will enable the GIRoA to carry out valid elections, encourage women's electoral participation as candidates, and train female National Assembly candidates and future leaders elected at the grassroots level. Assistance will also emphasize the importance of equal rights principles enshrined in the Afghan Constitution. U.S. election assistance will also help facilitate women's voting, making it a more inclusive process.

### **C. IR 1.3 - STRENGTHENED GOVERNANCE AND SERVICE DELIVERY AT NATIONAL AND SUB-NATIONAL LEVELS**

Improving the Afghan people's confidence in their government requires improved service delivery, greater accountability, and more protection from predatory practices, particularly in communities where the Taliban is providing its own brand of governance. A crosscutting element of all governance programs is support for reinvigorated Afghan plans to fight corruption with concrete measures towards greater accountability.

The USG continues to build core governance capacity at the national level through support for eight key offices that support the President, including the Office of Administrative Affairs (OAA), the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), the High Office of Oversight (HOO), and the Government Media and Information Center (GMIC). The USG provides program support to the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) and the Afghan National Assembly.

**Assistance to Parliament:** USG activities will strengthen the National Assembly to operate as a strong, independent, and effective legislative, representative oversight body. The Afghanistan Parliament Assistance Program (APAP) provides technical assistance and training to MPs, parliament staff, leadership offices, and National Assembly Committees to strengthen legislative capacities, oversight abilities, and constituency representation.

**Civil Service Reform:** The USG will provide assistance to improve civil service skills in key anticorruption areas (e.g. public financial management, financial institution regulation, procurement, budgeting, and human resource management) because a merit-based and qualified Afghan civil service strengthens governance and supports anti-corruption efforts.

**Sub-National Government Capacity Building:** To give Afghans a greater stake in their own government, the USG will implement local governance programs to broaden public support at the provincial and district levels. Civ-mil initiatives such as the District Development Working Groups and District Support Teams expand sub-national capacity building efforts in key population centers in the East and South.

Supporting programs such as the National Solidarity Program (NSP) and the Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD) provide community cash grants to provincial-level and

district-level shuras and communities in less secure provinces in Afghanistan's South, East, and West. Representative governance, albeit informal, is taking shape at the village level, with transformative effects on how people view government and the role of women in society. The Performance-Based Governor's Fund provides critical operating funding so that governors' offices can better respond to needs in their provinces. The Afghanistan Social Outreach Program is designed to put in place mechanisms to ensure ongoing communication and collaboration between government and communities through the creation of community councils at the district level. Governance programs closely aligned with the priorities of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and other Afghan government entities.

The Sub-National Governance Structure/RC East and RC South program, working with IDLG, provides training and support to 20 provincial councils for oversight and enhancement of the provincial development process. The USG places emphasis on understanding and meeting constituent needs. The USG provided technical assistance on budget and fiscal responsibilities, public opinion polling, town hall meetings, and the development of media strategies. The USG designs these programs to build capacities of local councils so they may better serve their constituents.

Other closely related USG efforts, including stabilization programming with IDLG reinforce programs that strengthen governance and service delivery at the national and sub-national level. Infrastructure development at the sub-national level, specifically water supply, roads, and energy, is critical for improved service delivery. Infrastructure improvements also support improved civilian perceptions of GIRoA effectiveness. Through the USG "Afghan First" policy, projects will employ Afghans and Afghan firms, provide on-budget assistance to GIRoA ministries and agencies, purchase goods in country, and develop and implement assistance through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund. This policy will increase Afghan confidence in the national government, while further building capacity.

#### **D. IR 1.4 – INCREASING DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICALLY ACTIVE CIVIL SOCIETY**

This IR focuses on strengthening the capacity of civil society and the media to provide channels for citizen participation in the political process and to hold government accountable. A serious governance deficiency identified in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)<sup>5</sup> is "weak community and civil society institutions." IR 1.4 will address the civil society and independent media capacity building needs for Afghan citizens to be able to more effectively participate in the political process, solve community problems, and advocate for good governance from their leaders.

The USG strives to promote gender equality, in which both men and women have equal opportunity to: benefit from and contribute to economic, social, cultural, and political development; enjoy socially valued resources and rewards; and realize their human rights. Activities under this IR will partially respond to U.S. Congressional earmarks specifying that "assistance for Afghanistan shall be made available, to the maximum extent practicable, in a manner that utilizes Afghan entities and emphasizes the participation and leadership of Afghan women and directly improves the security, economic and social well-being, and political status

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<sup>5</sup> *Islamic Republic of Afghanistan- Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)*, 1387 – 1391 (2008 – 2013)



of Afghan women and girls” and in particular for women-led nongovernmental organizations. The National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA) is the main resource for gender mainstreaming in Afghanistan's government institutions. One of its main pillars is Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights, with two sub components of 1) Legal Protection and Human Rights, and 2) Leadership and Political Participation. Cooperation on NAPWA implementation between ministries and civil society groups is specified in a number of areas.<sup>6</sup>

The USG will strengthen linkages between communities and the government, and provide citizens with skills and networks to effectively resolve community problems and influence decision making.

**Civil Society Sector Strengthening:** The USG supports the development of a strong and active civil society through technical assistance, capacity building, and grants to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Priorities include supporting improvement of the NGO legal enabling environment, as well as increased transparency and accountability involving cooperation with relevant ministries and parliament. The USG will invest in a nation-wide Afghan civil society strengthening and support network, expanding the reach of civil society support centers to citizens in all parts of Afghanistan. Finally, the USG will support expanded citizen understanding of the role of civil society in the Afghan context, encouraging citizen mobilization through community dialogues and policy advocacy on a local and national level. Increased numbers of citizens will be empowered to be actively engaged in their communities and the political process. Strengthening the capacity of CSOs will support citizen participation in policy and decision-making processes, policy analysis, advocacy, coalition-building and oversight of public institutions.

**Media Development:** The USG media development strategy builds upon previous investments and advances into new programmatic areas. A focus of the strategy is building Afghan capacity to meet international journalistic standards. Strengthening independent media is integral to supporting democratic development in Afghanistan. The growth and sustainability of a diverse and uniquely Afghan media industry and increasing the number of private individuals alternatively creating and sharing news and information are priorities. Capacity building in the provinces and districts at all levels and expansion of the availability of reliable information will allow Afghans to make informed choices about goods, services, their government, and the future of Afghanistan.

**Empowerment of Afghan Women and Girls:** To promote gender equality, participation, and leadership of Afghan women, the USG aims to improve the security, economic and social well-being, and political status of Afghan women and girls. Afghan girls and women now live under a Constitution that ensures their access to education, employment, and legal rights as well as an official framework to support their personal and professional development. However, further efforts are needed to prevent losing hard-won gains and securing an enduring role in decision-making and public life. USG activities will strengthen the ability of women-focused CSOs in Afghanistan to manage, implement, communicate, and advocate and play a greater role as partners in development. Contributing to Congressional directives addressing the needs and protecting the rights of Afghan women and girls will include cooperation with the Afghan

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<sup>6</sup> National Action Plan For The Women of Afghanistan (NAPWA), section 4.6, p. 30

Independent Human Rights Commission<sup>7</sup>, the Afghan Ministry of Women's Affairs as appropriate, and support for women-led nongovernmental organizations.

#### **E. IR 1.5 – DELEGITIMIZE THE INFLUENCE OF INSURGENT COMMUNICATIONS**

This IR focuses on strengthening the capacity of the media to provide legitimate channels of communication and information that demonstrate to Afghans that through partnership with GIRoA and international community Afghanistan will improve. The USG strategic communication strategy aligns all communication plans, resources, and initiatives to ensure the people of Afghanistan reject violent extremism, accept that GIRoA and the International Community are legitimate and capable long-term partners, and actively share in risks to achieve security, stability, and prosperity. Specifically, the USG strategic communication efforts will:

- Counter extremist voices by delegitimize and decreasing the influence of insurgent communications while demonstrating to Afghans how reform and partnership with GIRoA, ISAF, and the International Community will lead to a better Afghanistan;
- Strengthen people to people ties to promote a shared vision of Afghanistan's future, and to strengthen Afghanistan's culture and opinion leaders;
- Build Afghan Communication Capacity to increase the effectiveness of communications by GIRoA, the independent media, and the Afghan public; and
- Expand Media Engagement to inform and persuade key publics, and increase engagement with priority media categories.

### **III. CRITICAL ASSUMPTIONS**

The following assumptions are critical to the AO 1 Results Framework:

1. The Afghan government will implement its reinvigorated plans to fight corruption, with measures of progress toward greater accountability.
2. Justice and rule of law programs will focus on creating predictable and fair dispute resolution mechanisms to eliminate the vacuum that the Taliban have exploited.
3. USG programs will successfully address local officials' lack of education, experience, and limited resources.
4. GIRoA action will counter obstruction from local powerbrokers whose activities are sometimes inconsistent with the Afghan constitution.

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<sup>7</sup> This is pending GiRoA steps to "ensure the necessary political and financial support for the AIHRC while guaranteeing its constitutional status, and initiate discussions with the AIHRC within six months to explore its budgetary status." Kabul Communiqué July 2010.

## IV. MAJOR ISSUES OR CONCERNS

**Security:** Security is a precondition for governance and helps local government be more visible, accountable, and responsive. New civ-mil initiatives, such as the District Development Working Groups and District Support Teams, and supporting programs are structured to give Afghans a greater stake in their own government and also assist Afghan efforts to reduce corruption.

**Gender Considerations:** Women’s empowerment is linked to the achievement of USG objectives in Afghanistan including improvements in security, economic opportunity, governance, rule of law, and social development. Governance goals are to assist the Afghans to improve the security of women and institutions that serve women, support women’s leadership development in the public sector, and increase women’s political empowerment and participation. In addition to specific efforts already mentioned, the USG will expand women’s civil service opportunities through internships for women in Afghan ministries and diplomatic training to emerging Afghan women leaders from the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The USG will support the increasing number of women leaders, actively participating in the National Assembly and in their communities, to forward peace processes, and promote peace, justice, and human rights through its programming.

**Afghan First:** The U.S. strategy articulated in the “Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy” is to support Afghan leadership. AO1 programming supports Afghan capacity-building efforts at the national and sub-national levels.

**Annex II –A** contains detailed Performance Indicator Reference Sheets (PIRS) for each indicator. Each reference sheet is fully consistent with the guidance in ADS 203.

## U.S. MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE RESULTS FRAMEWORK

### AO 1: Improved performance and accountability of governance

IR 1.1: Increased public confidence in the Rule of Law system	IR 1.2: Strengthened competitive, inclusive and credible election and political processes	IR 1.3: Strengthened governance and service delivery at national and sub-national levels	IR 1.4: Increased development of politically active civil society	IR 1.5: Delegitimize the influence of insurgent communications.
IR 1.1.1: Formal Rule of Law system Improved	IR 1.2.1: Capability of GIRoA to effectively administer elections strengthened	IR 1.3.1: Administrative capacity and program execution of the executive branch improved.	IR 1.4.1: Civil society legal and regulatory framework improved	IR 1.5.1: Counter extremist voices
IR 1.1.2: Availability of quality legal education expanded	IR 1.2.2: Citizen awareness of electoral process increased	IR 1.3.2: Interagency coordination and policy formulation strengthened	IR 1.4.2: Citizen mobilization and capacity for civil society policy advocacy increased	IR 1.5.2: Strengthen people to people ties
IR 1.1.3: Citizen awareness of legal rights and legal processes of judicial system increased	IR 1.2.3: Democratic political party system enhanced	IR 1.3.3: Sub-national government made more operational, visible, and participatory	IR 1.4.3: Access to independent media and objective sources of information increased	IR 1.5.3: Build Afghan Communication Capacity
IR 1.1.4: Strengthened traditional dispute resolution and justice in contested areas	IR 1.2.4: Elected bodies at all levels are more representational	IR 1.3.4: Increased citizen awareness of reformed governance structures	IR 1.4.4: Participation of women-focused civil society strengthened organizations strengthened	IR 1.4.5: Expand Media Engagement
IR 1.1.5: Enhanced implementation of national anti-corruption		IR 1.3.5: Institutional capacity and oversight capacity of elected bodies at all levels strengthened		

## U.S. MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN HEALTH RESULTS FRAMEWORK

### AO 2: Improved health of the population

**IR 2.1: Effective utilization of BPHS and other client-oriented health services increased**

**Sub-IR 2.1.1: Access to Basic Package of Health (BPHS) Services and Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS) improved**

**Sub-IR 2.1.2: Quality of BPHS/EPHS improved**

**IR 2.2: Healthy behaviors adopted**

**Sub-IR 2.2.1: Communities mobilized to improve health**

**Sub-IR 2.2.2: Individuals, families, and communities have the knowledge and attitudes needed to protect their health**

**IR 2.3: GIRoA stewardship of the health system improved**

**Sub-IR 2.3.1: Human resources for health increased**

**Sub-IR 2.3.2: Key management systems strengthened**

**IR 2.4: Private sector health services and products strengthened**

**Sub-IR 2.4.1: Social Marketing programs expanded**

**Sub-IR 2.4.2: Health Professional Associations Strengthened**

## U.S. MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN EDUCATION RESULTS FRAMEWORK

### AO 3: Improved access to quality education services

**IR 3.1: Management capacity strengthened to deliver education services at the national, provincial, and district levels**

**Sub-IR 3.1.1: Improved strategic planning and data management capacity at the MoE at the national and provincial level**

**Sub-IR 3.1.2: Education management enhanced in targeted districts**

**Sub-IR 3.1.3: Strengthened management systems and staff capacity at the MoE**

**Sub-IR 3.1.4: Strengthened systems of accreditation and Quality Assurance at the MoHE and MoE**

**IR 3.2: Quality basic education expanded**

**Sub-IR 3.2.1: Expanded access to primary education with an emphasis on girls and underserved areas**

**Sub-IR 3.2.2: Increased community support to education**

**Sub-IR 3.2.3: Improved quality of the teaching force in target areas**

**Sub-IR 3.2.4: Out of school Youth and Adult literacy initiatives expanded in target areas**

**Sub-IR 3.2.5: Improved learning environment in primary and secondary schools in target areas**

**IR 3.3: Increased employability of Afghan Youth and Adults**

**Sub-IR 3.3.2: Increased population of skilled graduates from technical and vocational education and**

**Sub-IR 3.3.1: Access to quality workforce oriented higher education expanded**

## U.S. MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN ECONOMIC GROWTH RESULTS FRAMEWORK ECONOMIC GROWTH

**AO 4: A developed business climate that enables private investment, job creation, and financial independence**

**IR 4.1: Effective fiscal and monetary policy implemented**

**Sub-IR 4.1.1: Afghan government has increased capacity to conduct public financial management strengthened accordance with international standards**

**IR 4.1.2: Afghanistan maintains a stable monetary environment**

**IR 4.2: Policy, legal and regulatory framework for key economic sectors strengthened**

**Sub-IR 4.2.1: Policy and regulation in key sectors reformed**

**Sub-IR 4.2.2: Trade regime reformed**

**Sub-IR 4.2.3: Foundation for a more efficient land market established**

**IR 4.3: Competitiveness of private sector enhanced**

**Sub-IR 4.3.1: Capacity of private sector financial institutions increased**

**Sub-IR 4.3.2: Business development services improved**

**Sub-IR 4.3.3: Investment in the Afghan private sector increased**

**IR 4.4: Workforce meets private and public-sector demands**

**Sub-IR 4.4.1: Capacity to provide quality, demand-driven formal and non-formal workforce development improved strengthened**

**Sub-IR 4.4.2: Market-led Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) provided through private and public sector TVET schools**

**Sub-IR 4.4.3: Market-led business education and skills training (BEST) provided through public and private sector institutions**

## U.S. MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN AGRICULTURE RESULTS FRAMEWORK

### AO 5: A Sustainable, Thriving Agricultural Economy

**IR 5.1: Increased Agricultural Sector Jobs and Incomes as a result of USG assistance**

Sub-IR 5.1.1: Improved agricultural productivity

Sub IR 5.1.2: Increased commercial viability of small and medium farms and agri-businesses

Sub-IR 5.1.3: Improved stability in targeted, insecure areas

**IR 5.2: Improved Natural Resource Management as a result of USG assistance**

Sub-IR 5.2.1: Improved integrated water management

Sub IR 5.2.2: Improved environmental compliance

Sub IR 5.2.3: Biodiversity conserved in selected areas

**IR 5.3: Improved Delivery of Agricultural-Related Public Services as a result of USG assistance**

Sub IR 5.3.1: Improved agricultural education systems

Sub IR 5.3.2: Improved GIRoA agricultural research and extension services

Sub IR 5.3.3: Improved MAIL core functions



## U.S. MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN INFRASTRUCTURE, ENGINEERING, AND ENERGY RESULTS FRAMEWORK

### AO 6: Expanded, sustainable physical infrastructure

**IR 6.1: More efficient use of expanded water resources**

**Sub-IR 6.1.1: Improved access to water supply and sanitation**

**Sub-IR 6.1.2: Strengthened capacity to address trans-boundary water issue**

**IR 6.2: Improved management of an expanded network of roads**

**Sub-IR 6.2.1: Expanded construction and rehabilitation**

**Sub-IR 6.2.2: Better private sector and GIROA institutional capacity in roads operations and maintenance**

**IR 6.3: Better managed supply of electricity to a larger number of consumers**

**Sub-IR 6.3.1: Enhanced energy sector governance and management**

**Sub-IR 6.3.2: Generated supply of electricity increased and maintained**

**Sub-IR 6.3.3: Improved electricity transmission and distribution systems**

**IR 6.4 IR: An expanded and better managed network of vertical structures to support goals in health care, education and governance.**

**Sub-IR 6.4.1: New and rehabilitated facilities to support health care, education and governance**

**Sub-IR 6.4.2: Enhanced capacity in public and private sector to build, operate and maintain facilities.**

## U.S. MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN STABILIZATION RESULTS FRAMEWORK

### AO 7: Stability Sufficient for Basic Governance and Sustainable Development

#### IR 7.1: Local SOIs in targeted areas addressed

Sub-IR 7.1.1: Stakeholder ability to program against SOIs improved

Sub-IR 7.1.2: Community grievances resulting from civilian casualties addressed

#### IR 7.2: Basic local governance established

Sub-IR 7.2.1: Communities participating in local governance and development

Sub-IR 7.2.2: GIRoA providing basic governance

#### IR 7.3: Transition from stabilization assistance to sustainable development facilitated

Sub-IR 7.3.1: Cooperation between international community and GIRoA in support of transition facilitated

**Contextual IR: Freedom of movement increased for key stakeholders because of military efforts**

## **U.S. MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN DIRECT ASSISTANCE RESULTS FRAMEWORK**

**AO 8: Increased Management Effectiveness of GIRoA Institutions**

**IR 8.1: Core Functions of  
Selected Ministries  
Improved**

**IR 8.2: Afghan First  
Advanced**

**IR 8.3: Increased  
Utilization of On-budget  
Development Assistance**